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PRISONER AIDS TESTING: A COMMENT
ON DUNN V. WHITE
Given the magnitude and complexity of the AIDS problem, prison
systems must devise careful practices and policies both to protect
against the spread of the virus, and to treat those already infected. Dunn
v. White' raises concerns with the balance between judicial deference to
administrative penological decisionmaking and the court's responsibility
to protect the constitutional rights of incarcerated individuals. A case of
first impression specifically holding that the fourth amendment does not
protect prisoners from nonconsensual AIDS testing, Dunn fails to qualify
its sweeping rule with any procedural requirements. After Dunn, the
state need not put forth even a small measure of evidence that either the
nonconsensual testing is being performed pursuant to some plan for us-
ing the information, or that such a plan furthers an actual state interest
in performing the test. While fourth amendment analysis does not nec-
essarily preclude a state from forcing a prisoner to undergo an AIDS
test, Dunn opens the door to state abuse of prisoners by failing to re-
quire that state testing programs meet constitutional standards.
This note discusses recent fourth amendment analytical trends of
the United States Supreme Court as background for the case and ex-
plains the basic rationales supporting the limitation of prisoners' consti-
tutional rights. It presents the proposition that even despite the usual
lower level of constitutional guarantees afforded to prisoners, the Dunn
court gave constitutionally inadequate treatment to the plaintiff's
claims. First, the court failed to thoroughly analogize this case with the
cases it purported to follow. Second, it reached conclusions based upon
assumption rather than evidence. Third, Dunn's claim was dismissed
although clearly not ripe for dismissal under appropriate Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) standards. This note also questions whether
the broad holding of Dunn represents an open invitation for state abuses
to prisoners' fourth amendment rights.
I. AIDS AND PRISONS
The incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome in prison is
widely believed by inmate advocacy organizations to be much higher
than that in the general population for several reasons.2 According to
the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, 74% of all AIDS infections
are transmitted by unprotected homosexual activity and 17% by the
sharing of needles by intravenous drug users. 3 Unprotected homosex-
ual activity in prison, although undocumented, is believed to be rela-
1. 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989).
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, (N.J. ed.) at I, col. 4.
3. Id.
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tively common. Because of the scarcity of needles and the resultant
likelihood that an infected needle might be shared often, intravenous
drug use is more insidious in prison than on the outside. 4 More than
5,400 confirmed AIDS cases were reported through October 1989 by
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, state prison systems, and a sample of 38
local jail systems. This constituted a 606% increase from 1985 figures.
5
At the National Commission on AIDS meeting in New York in August,
1990, several doctors, 6 citing the "failure of prohibition," urged the
Commission to support decriminalization of drug use because, in their
view, relieving the AIDS epidemic in prisons will remain difficult as long
as the nation persists in imprisoning drug users.
7
While it would seem that testing and segregating inmates might be
logical solutions, the following problems have been identified. Tests for
AIDS are not reliable because they identify only the presence of antibo-
dies, not the presence of the infectious HIV virus which causes AIDS.8
This means that an inmate testing negative for HIV could actually be an
infectious carrier of the disease for a period of years before his body
enters the second stage of the disease, seroconversion, and begins to
produce detectable antibodies. 9 One administrator believes that during
this undetected-yet-infectious period, prisoners having a false sense of
security from negative tests might decide to ignore health care prevent-
ative measures and engage in high risk activities.' 0 In addition, most
prisons in the United States refuse to distribute condoms and clean
needles because to do so would admit that rules are being broken."I
Segregating HIV-positive inmates is counterproductive for both
healthy and infected inmates, according to the chief of HIV services at
the Vacaville, California prison, where segregation was implemented in
1985. "Segregating HIV positives creates the myth and feeling that
other inmates don't have to worry about getting infected."' 12 Segre-
gated HIV-positive prisoners at Vacaville brought a class action suit for
constitutional violations and entered into a consent decree with the state
allowing them to desegregate, at least during the day to participate in
educational activities, job training, recreation, and use of the library.'
3
4. Id.
5. Prisons' Care Systems Swamped by Aids Epidemic, 5 AIDS Policy & L. (BNA) No. 16, at 3
(September 5, 1990)[hereinafter Prisons' Care Systems].
6. Robert L. Cohen, medical director of St. Vincent Hospital's AIDS Center in New
York City and National Commission members Drs. Don C. Des Jarlais and Harlon Dalton,
Id.
7. Id.
8. Note, In Prison with AIDS: The Constitutionality of Mass Screening and Segregation Poli-
cies, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 155, 167.
9. Id. at 154.
10. Sampson, Letter to Editor, The Independent, May 29, 1990, at 16.
11. Prisons' Care Systems, supra note 5, at 4.
12. Id.
13. Gates v. Duekmejian, No. Civ S-87-1636 LKKJFM (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1989). See




II. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Background
The fourth amendment protects a citizen's reasonable expectations
of privacy 14 against intrusions by the government. Justice Brandeis has
called the "right to be let alone [ ] the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." 1 5 The amendment declares:
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 6
B. Traditional Analysis
Under older traditional fourth amendment analysis, the constitu-
tionality of the search or seizure typically turned upon such paramount
issues as whether the activity constituted a search or seizure, whether
probable cause' 7 existed to justify the state's activity, or whether a war-
rant was necessary. Typically, courts determined: 18 1) whether a search
has taken place and was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant or was
conducted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant require-
ment; 2) whether the search was based upon probable cause (or lesser
suspicion because it was minimally intrusive); and 3) whether the search
was conducted in a reasonable manner.
C. One Category of Modern Analysis: Special Governmental Needs
Justice Thurgood Marshall first used the term "special needs" cases
in referring to a recently-evolved category of fourth amendment opin-
ions of the Supreme Court. These cases upholding searches and
seizures despite the absence of probable cause or, in some cases even
suspicion, make use of an analysis that balances "special" governmental
need against the privacy interest of the individual.' 9 The Court first
moved away from the strict probable cause standard, allowing a search
despite the lack of any individualized suspicion, in an administrative in-
spection case, Camara v. Municipal Court.2 0 Although there the Court re-
quired an administrative warrant to prove the search was performed
pursuant to a fair and impartial plan, it considered the governmental
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)(overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347).
16. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Probable cause may relate to the belief a crime was committed, a particular person
is an offender, whether a search will be fruitful, or whether an item taken is evidence of an
offense.
18. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641-42 (1989)(Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 641.
20. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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intrusion less than a full-blown search. 2 1 Further, the Court justified the
search by balancing society's interest in conducting health, safety or fire
inspections against the individual's interest in resisting intrusion. 22 The
following year, the Court used the balancing test to hold that police of-
ficers could "stop and frisk" with less than probable cause because this
intrusion was likewise considered less than a full-blown search.23 In re-
cent years the Court has departed further from the probable cause stan-
dard, frequently finding governmental intrusions constitutional despite
a lack of probable cause or individualized suspicion. 24 In cases where
the Court has permitted governmental searches and seizures absent
some measure of suspicion, it has required that the governmental activ-
ity be pursuant to some recognized fair and impartial plan benefiting a
legitimate state interest.25 Balancing, with or without probable cause,
has now become the norm in fourth amendment analysis.2 6 It is clear
that in either a civil or criminal context, the greater the level of govern-
mental intrusion upon the person or property of the individual, the
greater the justification and stricter the controls for search or seizure
must be.
2 7
The new "special needs" analysis considers these issues: 1)
21. Id. at 537.
22. Id. at 534-39.
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(holding that reason to suspect, rather than prob-
able cause, justified the intrusion).
24. Michigan Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)(no probable cause neces-
sary to justify "sobriety checkpoint" stops to further governmental interest in highway
safety, so long as pursuant to fair and impartial plan where all drivers are stopped); Colo-
rado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)(inventory search of vehicle absent individualized sus-
picion permissible under the fourth amendment if pursuant to standardized procedures);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)(police officers may not stop drivers randomly
without reason to suspect); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)(per-
mitting routine, non-probable cause searches of baggage, vehicles and persons at the bor-
ders to further government interest in protecting against illegal aliens; however, the
government, in protecting against smuggling activity, must meet a reason to believe stan-
dard in order to justify deeply intrusive personal searches); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967)(no probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant for a particular
dwelling, but warrant requirement eliminates inspector's untrammeled discretion, by re-
quiring him to show the inspection is part of an impartial administrative plan to further
interest of government in health, safety and fire code inspections).
25. Supra note 24.
26. "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment... requires a balanc-
ing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the
search entails." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 725 (1987)(balancing the need for "the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace"); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987)(balancing need to preserve
"the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement" of probation); New Jersey v. T. L.
0., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)(balancing "the substantial need of teachers and administra-
tors for freedom to maintain order in the schools"); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985) (balancing the probable cause that evidence of a crime could be found against indi-
vidual's interest in avoiding surgical intrusion to remove the bullet).
27. Gooding v. U.S., 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974)(Marshall, J., dissenting); Blackburn v.
Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 565 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1328
(5th Cir. 1978). See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(intrusion into a
DUI suspect's body for blood testing requires both probable cause and a warrant, unless
delay would threaten the loss or destruction of the evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925)(search of a car requires only probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968) (a police officer's stop and frisk of a citizen is justified by reason to suspect).
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whether the governmental action infringed upon the fourth amendment
rights of the individual; 2) the governmental interest being addressed by
the search or seizure;28 3) whether a logical nexus exists between the
search or seizure activity and the governmental interest pursued;29 4)
whether the governmental activity was conducted in a reasonable man-
ner,30 and, in the absence of any individualized suspicion, pursuant to a
fair procedure;3 ' and 5) whether the government has demonstrated that
its interests outweigh the privacy expectations of the individual.
3 2
1. Warrants and Probable Cause: Substitution of "Nexus" and
"Fair Procedure"
It appears that the warrant requirement has been virtually elimi-
nated from cases falling within the "special needs" category,3 3 most
likely because search warrants require a showing of probable cause, no
longer a constitutional requisite under the new "special needs" category
of cases.
34
Under the more traditional fourth amendment model, the nexus re-
quirement used in the "special needs" analysis is totally unnecessary be-
cause probable cause establishes the requisite reasonableness linking
the governmental interest and the search and seizure activity. Likewise,
the requirement for an equitable and fair procedure by officials in deter-
mining who shall be searched or seized,33 while essential to the "special
needs" analysis, is superfluous under the established form because the
question of who shall be searched or seized is answered automatically by
the probable cause requirement. If, indeed, there is a true balancing of
interests under the traditional model, that element of individualized sus-
picion acts as a stabilizer on behalf of the individual. Under fourth
amendment analysis in the "special needs" category, if no individualized
28. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979).
29. NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)("One must determine whether the
search.., was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place."); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)("The search will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objec-
tives of the search and not excessively intrusive..."); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90
(1987)(referring to constitutional rights in general, including fourth amendment rights,
the court states "[Tihere must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regula-
tion and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Thus, a regulation
cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted
goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.").
30. NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)(the Court's analysis for reasonableness
under the fourth amendment included examination of the manner in which Mr. Choplick
conducted the search of T.L.O.'s purse; the requirement that the manner of search be
reasonable is implicit in the opinion.).
31. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
32. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
33. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985).
34. Id.
35. See Michigan Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990).
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suspicion is involved, the elements of fair procedure and nexus appear to
furnish the reasonableness automatically supplied by probable cause
under the traditional model.
2. Special Needs Analysis in the Prison Context
"Special needs" analysis in the prison context is somewhat skewed.
Prisoners' privacy interests are given less weight for two reasons: the
need for preserving institutional security,3 6 and the notion that prison-
ers generally retain a lower level of constitutional rights.3 7 While hon-
oring the policy of judicial deference to prison decisionmaking, 38 the
Court requires prison officials to "put forward" a legitimate penological
interest to justify the regulation.39  However, the level of evidence
needed to "put forward" a state interest has never been specified. In-
stead, it is only clear that some evidence is necessary. 40 Additionally,
the impact of the constitutional accommodation on prison guards, in-
mates and resources must be evaluated, as well as whether an alternate
means of accomplishing the penological goal could be employed, to in-
sure that a regulation is not an exaggerated response to a perceived
need.
4 '
III. FACTS OF DUNN V. WHITE
Prisoner Terry Dunn filed a pro se civil rights action4 2 in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging
that state prison officials had both assaulted him and, by threatening
disciplinary segregation, forced him to submit to an AIDS test despite
his religious objections and without benefit of a hearing. Dunn's com-
36. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
37. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984)(prisoners retain those rights not
inconsistent with imprisonment or the objectives of incarceration).
38. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
39. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
40. Id.; Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990)("Prison officials must
'put forward' a legitimate governmental interest to justify their regulation . . . and must
provide evidence that the interest proffered is the reason why the regulation was adopted or
enforced."). See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 578 n.1, and 579 (1984)(demonstrat-
ing state interest by showing of evidence); Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.
1990)("prison officials must at least produce some evidence that their policies are based
on legitimate penological justifications"). Accord Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 598-600
(7th Cir. 1986)(it is only after prison officials have put forth such evidence that courts
defer to the officials'judgment); Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921, 925 (3rd Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986).
41. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states "[elvery person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." A governmental agency (for exam-
ple, a state department of corrections) can be a "person" acting under color of law if it
implements a decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers, or "vis-
ited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received for-
mal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell v. Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978).
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plaint was dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Although the court of appeals failed to rec-
ognize any valid procedural due process claim raised by the plaintiff re-
garding a hearing, 43 the court believed his allegations supported claims
under the first and fourth amendments, as incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment. 44 This case discussion is limited to only those
facially-supported claims.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN DUNN V. WHITE
After briefly summarizing Supreme Court rationales regarding
prison cell and body cavity searches, the court turned to address the
elevated level of intrusion represented by governmental search and
seizure of bodily fluids. Because the question of forced AIDS testing
was one of first impression, the court relied on analyses from four search
and seizure cases that involved testing the plaintiffs' bodily fluids for
evidence of drug use.45 Drug testing was found to be unconstitutional
in only one of the four cases, Berry v. District of Columbia.4 6 A "special
needs" balancing analysis was used in each of the four cases. After first
deciding that removal of bodily fluids constitutes a search for fourth
amendment purposes, each court considered the following factors in
varying degrees: 1) the nature and scope of the governmental interest
in the testing; 2) an examination of the governmental interest for proce-
dural safeguards used to choose who would be tested and testing meth-
odology;4 7 3) the logical nexus between the governmental testing and
the state's interest; and 4) the privacy interest of the plaintiff weighed
against the governmental need for testing. The Dunn court did not util-
ize all of these elements in its analysis. Rather, it seemed to pick and
43. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 1190. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to the
states those selectively incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees found to be "fundamental to
the American scheme of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (incorporating the fourth amendment); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)(incorporating the free exercise clause of the first
amendment).
45. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1192-94. The four cases relied upon by the court in Dunn were:
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d
1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987); and Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986).
46. In Berry, pretrial detainees were foreclosed from leaving prison unless they sub-
mitted to drug testing of their bodily fluids. The state interest was perceived by the Berry
court to be other than the stated interest in prison security. The case was remanded for
further factual development regarding the state's interest. It is apparent that the Tenth
Circuit attributed this finding of unconstitutionality to the "criminal context" of the case,
saying, "We agree ... that searches in the noncriminal context such as this one [Dunn v.
White] raise different constitutional concerns than those implicated in Berry." Dunn, 880
F.2d at 1192.
47. In Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986), one important reason for
holding the search of prisoners' bodily fluids to be constitutional was that the state's pro-
cedure for choosing who would be tested did not "unnecessarily [expose] prisoners to the
risk of harassment," the rationale being that because it was truly random the procedure
did not lend itself to abuse.
1991)
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choose among the elements, paying lip service to some and ignoring
one completely.
A. The Nature and Scope of the State's Interest
In Dunn, the State of Oklahoma never supported its "interest" in
testing for AIDS with a scintilla of evidence. It neither put forth a show-
ing that it had a plan for the treatment or segregation of AIDS victims,
nor that it was in the process of formulating one. Vaguely, it stated that
"protecting inmates from exposure to a fatal venereal disease is the sort
of legitimate penological goal which outweighs the Appellant's necessar-
ily limited religious rights."148 This is as close as the state came to sup-
porting the state interest requirement of the fourth amendment analysis.
The Dunn court was quick to supply the State of Oklahoma with the
requisite state interest through assumption and generalization, rather
than evidence. 49 Perhaps the greatest reason for finding a state interest
without any showing of evidence was the frightfulness of the AIDS epi-
demic itself. The court openly admitted that it reached the conclusion
of a state interest based upon the seriousness of the disease and its
transmissibility. 50  In effect, the court said that state prisons, in testing
for AIDS, automatically overcome the burden of showing a state interest
because the disease itself is seen as a monumental problem.
If states need not demonstrate a state interest, then they may test
prisoners for any reason, so long as they conclusively plead an interest
in controlling or treating AIDS. The court of appeals in Dunn went a
step further to make this clear: the State of Oklahoma was held to have
a state interest in controlling and treating AIDS at the same time that
the court inconsistently presumed that the state neither attempted to
control the spread of AIDS nor attempted to treat those already
infected. 5
B. Examination of State's Interest for Procedural Safeguards
And Testing Methodology
The Dunn court contended that its analysis followed the reasoning
of the Von Raab and Skinner balancing tests.52 The Supreme Court in
48. Brief for Appellees at 3 (emphasis added), Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th
Cir. 1989)(No. 88-2194).
49. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1989)(the court provided sev-
eral rationales: "prevention of the spread of AIDS in prison would justify the intrusion... ;
[t]he goal of controlling the spread of venereal disease may justify coerced medical testing
... ; an attempt to ascertain the extent of the problem is certainly a legitimate penological
purpose... ; "[the prison] has an interest in making an extra effort to protect prisoners
from a fatal disease... ; the prison, as caretaker, has an interest in diagnosing and provid-
ing adequate health care to those already infected with AIDS...").
50. "In light of the seriousness of the disease and its transmissibility, we conclude that
the prison has a substantial interest in pursuing a program to treat those infected with the
disease and in taking steps to prevent further transmission. We further conclude that the
prison's substantial interest outweighs plaintiff's expectation of privacy." Id. at 1196.
51. "[W]e must assume that the prison does not currently use the information it gath-
ers either to treat or to control the spread of AIDS." Id. at 1196 (emphasis added).
52. "Under the reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab, this court must therefore balance
[Vol. 68:4
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those cases, however, scrutinized the governmental interest in laborious
detail, inspecting both essential, equitable elements of procedure and
the methodology implemented by the testing program. In contrast, the
Dunn court examined no governmental interest because no evidence of
such interest was put forth. Unlike the Court's examination of the regu-
latory schemes in both Von Raab and Skinner, the Dunn court asserted
that, for purposes of its analysis, it would assume that the State of
Oklahoma had no plan of AIDS treatment to be examined. 53 Thus,
constitutional safeguards were wholly ignored, leaving a hollow, unqual-
ified holding. In essence, the court held that prisoners do not have a
bodily integrity fourth amendment right to protection against noncon-
sensual AIDS testing by the state.
The court did put forth a rationale for excluding the element of
regulatory scrutiny from its analysis. It stated, inaccurately, that the
plaintiff did not directly challenge the prison's program of AIDS treat-
ment or lack of any program, nor did he challenge the failure of the state
to segregate AIDS prisoners. 54 However, the plaintiff did challenge the
state's interest, claiming that since the prison neither treated nor segre-
gated AIDS victims, it could not have a legitimate penological goal. 55
Despite this, the Tenth Circuit perfunctorily declared that the "complex
constitutional issues arising from such allegations [were] not currently
before us."'56  To the contrary, such issues were before the court in
this case both because the plaintiff raised them and because an examina-
tion of the governmental program is essential to a thorough fourth
amendment analysis under the Supreme Court cases which the court
purported to follow. For example, in National Treasury Employees' Union v.
Von Raab,5 7 the suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs personnel
applying for promotion to certain key positions was held reasonable
under the fourth amendment. While evidence on the record of bribes,
trickery and danger supported the governmental interest in drug test-
ing,5 8 the most compelling evidence was the carefully scrutinized gov-
ernmental program itself.59  Part of the program did not seem
adequately tailored to suit the governmental interest and was thus re-
manded for further examination by the court of appeals. 60 It can be
stated with certainty that careful evaluation of both the regulatory pro-
gram, and the logical nexus between governmental goals and the pro-
the intrusiveness of the blood test against the prison's need to administer the test." Id. at
1194.
53. Id. at 1196.
54. Id. at 1196, n.4.
55. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989)(No.
88-2194).
56. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196, n.4.
57. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
58. Id. at 669.
59. Id. at 666. ("[t]he purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those
eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promo-
tion of drug users to those positions. These substantial interests ... present a special need
."). See id. at 660-63.
60. Id. at 677-79.
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gram, was absolutely essential to the Court's analysis. Because the Dunn
court purported to follow the reasoning of Von Raab,6 1 the careful scru-
tiny of any governmental testing program was, of necessity, before the
court in Dunn, however the court may have justified its refusal to recog-
nize the issue.
C. Logical Nexus Between State's Interest and Testing
It is ironic that the Dunn court found a logical nexus 62 between the
stated governmental interest and an AIDS testing program where "the
prison does not currently use the information it gathers either to treat or
to control the spread of AIDS."' 63 Perhaps to justify such a finding, the
court offered the statement that "[t]he prison will ultimately bear re-
sponsibility for decisions on segregation and treatment, and certainly it
is reasonable to attempt to avoid making such decisions in a vacuum."
64
Nowhere in the four opinions relied upon by the Dunn court 6 5 did the
Supreme Court or the circuit courts find a nexus between an unsup-
ported interest and unexamined regulatory scheme justifiable simply be-
cause the government will ultimately bear responsibility for whatever
decisions it reaches.
D. Privacy Interest of the Plaintiff Weighed Against the Governmental
Need for Testing
The court had little difficulty reaching the decision that the
"prison's substantial interest outweighs plaintiff's expectation of pri-
vacy." 6 6 Reflection upon this decision invites consideration of the tan-
dem philosophies of the United States Supreme Court, often in tension,
that intertwine throughout prisoners' rights cases. 6 7 The Court has a
long history of judicial restraint regarding decisionmaking in this area,
reasoning that prison officials are better equipped to determine their
own health and safety policies. 68 Moreover, the separation of powers
principle requires that courts refrain from encroaching upon territory
properly lying within the province of legislatures and their agency off-
61. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1989). The court also claimed to
follow the reasoning of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989),
using the same analysis.
62. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spence v. Far-
ier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986).
66. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196 (10th Cir. 1989).
67. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)(the Court reaffirms its
stance on refusal to substitute its judgment for the judgment of those charged with run-
ning a prison); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-06 (1974)(despite the deference
standard, courts must hear valid constitutional claims).
68. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
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spring.69 On the other hand, the Court has steadfastly applied strict
scrutiny, despite separation of powers arguments, whenever the civil
rights of citizens, particularly "discrete and insular minorities," are
threatened by governmental powers. 70 Justice Edwards of the D.C. Cir-
cuit writes:
Indeed, the special place of prisoners in our society makes
them more dependent on judicial protection than perhaps any
other group. Few minorities are so 'discrete and insular,' so
little able to defend their interests through participation in the
political process, so vulnerable to oppression by an unsympa-
thetic majority. Federal courts have a special responsibility to
ensure that the members of such defenseless groups are not
deprived of their constitutional rights.
7 1
It is clear, regardless of whether prisoners are a "discrete and insu-
lar minority," that incarceration does not mandate that the Court aban-
don its protective role regarding constitutional rights. In Procunier v.
Martinez,72 the Court explained that "a policy of judicial restraint cannot
encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims
whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regula-
tion or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal
courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."'7 3 Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the concurrence in Rhodes v. Chapman,
74
pointed out that "lower courts have learned from repeated investigation
and bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitu-
tional dictates - not to mention considerations of basic humanity - are
to be observed in the prisons."
'7 5
V. DOES DUNN V. WHITE INVITE CONSTITUTIONAL ABUSES?
In his dissent in Dunn v. White, Justice McKay, stressing that the ma-
jority's holding was far too sweeping, suggested that because of the
known seriousness of AIDS, a prison would now not need to show even
its claimed interest. 7 6 Typical governmental abuses of AIDS prisoners
were brought to light at the August, 1990 National Commission on
AIDS meeting in New York City.7 7 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) reported that convicts in Alabama, for example, are routinely
tested for HIV without either their consent or knowledge. If they test
positive, they are isolated and then transferred to a special HIV prison
69. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979). Accord, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85
(1987).
70. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
71. Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 960 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(referring to
Carolene Products Footnote No. 4). For an excellent discussion on this subject, see Com-
ment, Sentenced to Prison, Sentenced to AIDS: The Eighth Amendment Right to be Protected from
Prison's Second Death Row, 92 DxCK. L. REV. 863, 872-77 (1988).
72. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
73. Id. at 405-06(emphasis added)(citingJohnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,486 (1969)).
74. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
75. Id. at 354.
76. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 1989).
77. Prisons' Care Systems, supra note 5, at 4.
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ward. They are given no AIDS counseling and often are told they have
only days to live. They must scrub toilet seats and telephones after use
and are forced to dispose of their garbage in bright red trash bags. Con-
fidentiality is impossible to maintain because even their clothes are
stamped "HIV."
78
Letters to the ACLU from prisoners describe the "living hell" that
confronts HIV-positive inmates. They write of physical and verbal
abuse from prison guards and health workers, lack of counseling, irregu-
lar treatment, and difficulty in consulting medical specialists outside
prison. One prisoner wrote that inmates taken to see specialists were
placed in leg irons and handcuffs, despite their weakened condition. "I
have witnessed inmates tossed around, in pain ... the circulation [was]
cut off from the hands because of the tightness of the handcuffs."
'79
This is not to suggest that such abuses are prevalent in the Tenth
Circuit. But if prisons were required to make a showing of state interest
to justify AIDS testing, and if the court would uphold constitutional pro-
cedural safeguards, such abuses might be avoided. Attorneys for states
within the Tenth Circuit relying on the Dunn precedent might advise
their clients that AIDS testing within prisons has not been found to vio-
late prisoners' fourth amendment privacy interests, regardless of
whether or not the testing is performed pursuant to a plan meeting con-
stitutional muster. Because the court refused to require any showing of
a constitutionally adequate program in Dunn, discriminatory, punitive,
experimental, or non-confidential testing has not been specifically pro-
scribed. Walker v. Sumner 80 typifies constitutional loopholes left open by
such a precedent; its holding is essentially the McKay dissent in Dunn.
A. Walker v. Sumner
In Walker, Andrew Walker, the pro se plaintiff, alleged that his non-
consensual AIDS blood test violated his fourth amendment rights. 8 1
The blood tests were allegedly part of a state healthcare workers train-
ing program that used prisoners as practice specimens so that students
could learn to administer the AIDS test properly. Walker alleged that
when he refused the test, because he had already been tested at the
prison, he was threatened by a guard with a taser gun8 2 until he submit-
ted. The district court, holding that prison officials had a paramount
interest in identifying carriers of the AIDS virus and that an AIDS test is
reasonably related to that legitimate penological objective, granted sum-
mary judgment to the state. The Ninth Circuit reversed, saying:
Prison authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory asser-
tions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990).
81. The plaintiff also alleged his eighth amendment rights had been violated.
82. A taser gun "operates by firing a tiny dart, attached to the gun with wires, into the
prisoner... administering a low amperage, high voltage electrical shock, which temporar-
ily incapacitates the prisoner." Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the specific penological interests involved and then demon-
strate both that those specific interests are the actual bases for
their policies and that the policies are reasonably related to the
furtherance of the identified interests. An evidentiary showing
is required as to each point... [w]e do not know for example
whether the samples were being collected purely for statistical
purposes, whether the prison officials intended to isolate AIDS
carriers, whether they planned to provide some form of medi-
cal treatment for those who tested HIV positive, or even
whether they would use the results for any purpose at all.
Without a further explanation, general protestations of con-
cern for the welfare of. . . the prison community are simply
insufficient to render the involuntary seizure of blood speci-
mens, even from prison inmates, constitutionally reasonable.
8 3
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
Dunn claimed two additional bases of protection from nonconsen-
sual AIDS testing: his religious beliefs under the first amendment, and
an Oklahoma statute granting exemption from such testing to those with
certain religious beliefs.
In its examination of the first amendment claim, the court de-
pended upon Wisconsin v. Yoder 8 4 to preclude the plaintiff's complaint
from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, saying "[a] philosoph-
ical and personal choice 'does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses.' "85 But, as Judge McKay pointed out in his dissent, this con-
cept has been recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Frazee v. Illinois
Dep't of Employment.8 6 To substantiate a first amendment claim after Fra-
zee, it is enough for a plaintiff to show a sincere religious belief, regard-
less of whether that belief is responsive to a particular organized
religion. The Dunn court further contended that the plaintiff's religious
affirmations were vague and conclusory, stating "at no time has he gone
any further than merely reciting the word 'religion.' -87 But Dunn did
go beyond merely reciting the word "religion" when he defined his un-
derstanding of the word religious for the court, as "relating or devoted
to the divine or that which is held to be of ultimate importance," 8 8 and
explaining that religion for him is a set of such beliefs. 89
In examining the Oklahoma statute raised by the plaintiff,9 0 the
court questioned whether the statutory religious exemption applies to
83. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1990)(emphasis added).
84. 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
85. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 216 (1972)).
86. 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)("we reject the notion that to claim the protection of the
Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization.").
87. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197.
88. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989)(No.
88-2194).
89. Id.
90. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-516.1 (1984).
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prisoners. 9 1 The court perceived this query as irrelevant, however,
holding that this exemption would not apply to Dunn's religious beliefs.
Despite the lack of any evidence regarding the plaintiff's specific beliefs,
the court decided the Oklahoma exemption did not apply to Dunn be-
cause it is only for those "who, because of religious belief, in good faith
select[] and depend[] upon spiritual means or prayer for the treatment
or cure of disease."' 92 Again, the court supplied an assumption in place
of evidence, this time concluding that the plaintiff's personal religious
beliefs could not possibly fall within the exemption, thus denying him
any protection provided by the very statute he himself raised in defense
of his claim. The Supreme Court has held that Rule 12(b)(6) does not
countenance dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a plaintiff's fac-
tual allegations. 93 Clearly, some evidentiary showing was required.
VII. DUNN V. WHITE FROM A PROCEDURAL STANDPOINT
Granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions is generally looked upon with disfa-
vor because doing so contradicts the basic judicial precept that a case
should be tried on the proofs, rather than on the pleadings.9 4 Thus,
when considering motions to dismiss, courts should both construe com-
plaints liberally and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.9 5
Dunn came before the court of appeals as a review of the district
court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). However, the case clearly was not ripe for dismissal. Rule
12(b)(6) motions call upon the court to make two decisions: first,
whether a claim showing entitlement to relief has been stated,9 6 and
second, whether, based on law and fact, relief can be granted on such a
claim.9 7 In Dunn, the court maintained that the plaintiff's allegations of
religious beliefs facially supported both a fourth and a first amendment
claim,9 8 thus passing the first hurdle of the 12(b)(6) analysis. The sec-
91. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197.
92. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-516.1 (1984)).
93. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
94. Carss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 252 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1958); Rennie & Laugh-
lin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957); Buchler v. United States, 384 F.
Supp. 709 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Beenken v. Chicago & Northern R.R., 367 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D.
Iowa 1973). See Action Repair Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 776 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.
1985)(Courts should not make judgment calls on allegations in pleadings, dismissal at
summary judgment stage more appropriate).
95. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1957).
96. Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., 513 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1975); Mac-
Kenzie v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 472 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Miss.
1979); Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ind. 1968); Bing v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 237 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Hoffman v. Weider, 217 F.
Supp. 172 (D.NJ. 1963).
97. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). Also, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss, the court may consider legal arguments presented in briefs and matters
which are the subject ofjudicial notice. United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F.
Supp. 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp.
564 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
98. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989).
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ond hurdle of the analysis requires the court to accept the plaintiff's
allegations of fact 9 and every fairly deducible inference therefrom' 0 0 as
true for purposes of the motion. The court is authorized to dismiss a
claim based upon a dispositive issue of law only "if, as a matter of law, 'it
is clear that no relief could be granted under any set offacts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.' "101 The fourth amendment
claim was dismissed because the court refused to examine the state's
interest, substituting its own assumptions for evidence. The first
amendment claim was dismissed because the court assumed that Dunn's
religious beliefs could not factually support a first amendment claim; '
0 2
nor could they support a claim under the Oklahoma statutory exemp-
tion.' 0 3 However, the court asserted that Dunn never expressed what
his specific religious beliefs were."10 The opinion did not explain how
an allegation could provide facial support for a first amendment
claim, '0 5 and yet simultaneously be so insubstantial as to fail to support
a first amendment claim. 10 6 If indeed facts were missing, as the court
believed and articulated, then the facially-supported claim was not ripe
for dismissal. Because a plaintiff's complaint need only show that he or
she holds a sincere religious belief, 10 7 further questions of fact should
be left for appropriate future resolution by the finder of fact. Further-
more, the mandate of Hughes v. Rowe '0 8 requiring an indulgent interpre-
tation of a pro se plaintiff's allegations, was virtually ignored by the court
in practice, although alluded to in an early part of the opinion. 0 9
CONCLUSION
Because of Dunn v. White, prisoners' fourth amendment rights in the
context of AIDS testing has become a misnomer in the Tenth Circuit. It
is interesting to note the willingness of the court to supply assumptions
in place of evidence. For example, it found an (assumed) fourth amend-
ment state interest without requiring a scintilla of evidence, and later
99. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
100. Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 386 (10th Cir. 1976).
101. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)(quoting Hishan v. King, 467 U.S.
69, 73 (1984))(emphasis added).
102. "The mere assertion of generic religious objections is not sufficient to invoke first
amendment protections." Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197.
103. "[T~he exemption [in OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, Sec. 1-516.1 (1984)] is for those 'who,
because of religious belief, in good faith select[] and depend[] upon spiritual means or
prayer for the treatment or cure of disease.' Plaintiff's vague allegation that he declined
AIDS testing on generic 'religious grounds' does not implicate this exemption." Id. (citations
omitted)(emphasis added).
104. "Plaintiff did not accompany his allegation with any details about his religious
faith, nor did he allege what tenet of his faith required that he refuse the test." Id.
105. "Plaintiff's factual allegations that he refused consent to a medical test on reli-
gious grounds, and was then forced to submit to the test, at least facially support claims
under the first and fourth amendments, as incorporated into the fourteenth." Id. at 1190.
106. "[P]laintiff has supported his first amendment claim with only a conclusory allega-
tion of religious exemption." Id. at 1198.
107. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment, 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
108. 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980).
109. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989).
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supplied the plaintiff himself with an (assumed) set of disadvantageous
religious beliefs that precluded him from possible exemption from AIDS
testing under the Oklahoma statute. This is judicial deference at its
worst. By refusing to require any evidence, the court's decision was
based upon nothing but its own assumptions. Dunn v. White may repre-
sent an abatement of individual rights resulting from governmental
needs perceived to be so monumental that constitutional safeguards
may be overlooked, particularly in light of the plaintiff's prisoner status.
What is so disturbing about this case also illustrates one very serious
problem inherent in the fourth amendment balancing analysis itself: in
deciding whether or not a governmental intrusion is permissible under
the fourth amendment, absent any individualized suspicion require-
ment, the scales may be tipped in favor of the government simply be-
cause the individual's need for privacy is viewed by some courts as
eminently disproportionate in relation to any given governmental need.
In this context, Justice Marshall warns:
Precisely because the need for action against [a perceived dan-
ger] is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional
excess is great. History teaches that grave threats to liberty
often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights
seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-
camp cases, the Red Scare and McCarthy-Era internal subver-
sion cases are only the most extreme reminders that when we
allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real
or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.1 10
Monica Brion
110. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)(Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
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